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Suyreme Court of tMe United States.
EX PARTE GARLAND.
The Act of Congress of January 24th 1865, prescribing an oath to be taken by
attorneys, is unconstitutional as applied to attorneys of this court who were
admitted before the passage of the act.
Even if the act were constitutional, the oath could not be exacted from an
attorney who has been pardoned by the President for all offences arising from participation in the rebellion.

ON motion for leave to practise as an attorney.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELI, J.-On the 2d of July 1862, Congress passed an act
prescribing an oath to be taken by every person elected or
appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government
of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval
departments of the -public service, except the President of the
United States, before entering upon the duties of his office, and
before'being entitled to its salary, or other emoluments. On the
24th of January 1865, Congress passed & supplementary act
extending its provisions so as to embrace attorneys and counsellors of the courts of the United States. It provides that after
its passage no person shall be admitted as an attorney and counsellor to the bar of the Supreme Court, and, after the 4th of
March 1865, to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the
United. States, or Court of Claims, or be allowed to appear and
be- heard by virtue of any previous admission, or any special
power of attorney, unless he shall have first taken and subscribed
'the oath'prescribecl in the Act of July 2d 1862. The act also
provides that the oath shall he preserved among the files of the
court and if any person take it falsely he shall be guilty of perjury, and, upon conviction, shall be subject to the pains and penalties of that offence.
At the December Term of 1860, the petitioner was admitted as
an attorney and counsellor of this court, and took and subscribed
the oath then required. By the second rule, as it then existed, it
was only requisite to the admission of attorneys and counsellors
of this court, that they should have been such officers for the
three previous years in the highest courts of the states to which
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they respectively belonged, and that their private and professional
character should appear to be fair.
In March 1865, this rule was changed by the addition of a
clause requiring the administration of the oath, in conformity with
the Act of Congress.
In May 1861, the state of Arkansas, of which the petitioner
was a citizen, passed an ordinance of secession, which purported
to withdraw the state from the Union, and afterwards, in the same
year, by another ordinance, attached herself to the so-called Confederate States, and by act of the congress of that confederacy
was received as one of its members.
The petitioner followed the state, and was one of her representatives-first in the lower house, and afterwards in the senate, of
the congress of that confederacy, and was a member of the senate
at the time of the surrender of the confederate, forces to the
armies of the United States.
: In July 1865, he received from the President of the United
States a full pardon for all offences committed by him by participation, direct or implied, in the rebellion. He now produces this
pardon, and, asks- permission to continue to practise as an attorney
and counsellor of. the. court without taking the oath required by
the Acdt of January 24th 1865, and the rule of this court, which
he is unable to take, by reason of the offices he held under the
confederate government. He rests his application principally
upon two grounds1st. That the Act of January 24th 1865, so far as it affects his
status in'the court, is unconstitutional and void; and,
,2d. That, if the act be constitutional, he is released from compliance with its provisions by the pardon of the President.
The oath prescribed by the act is as follows:
'(st. That the deponent has never voluntarily borne arms against
the United States since he has been a citizen thereof;
2d. That he has not voluntarily given aid, countenance, counsel,
or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto ;
3d. That he has never sought, accepted, or attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatsoever, under any authority, or
pretended authority, in hostility to the United States;
4th. That he has not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution, within the
United States, hostile or inimical thereto; and
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5th. That he *ill support and defend the Constitution of the
'United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same.
This last clause is promissory only, and requires no consideration. The questions presented for our determination arise from
the other clauses. These all relate to past acts. Some of these
acts constituted, when they were committed, offences against the
criminal laws of the country, and some of them may, or may not,
have been offences, according to the circumstances under which
they were committed, and the motives of the parties. The first
clause covers one form of the crime of treason, and the deponent
must declare that, he has not been guilty of this crime, not only
during the war of the rebellion, but during any period of his life
since he has been a citizen. The second clause goes beyond the
limits of treason, and embraces not only the giving of aid and
encouragement of a treasonable nature to a public enemy, but
also the giving of assistance of any kind to persons engaged in
armed hostility to the United States. The third clause applies
to the seeking, acceptance, or exercise not only of offices created
for the purpose of more effectually carrying on hostilities, but
also of any of those offices which are required in every community, whether in peace or war, for the administration of justice
and the preservation of order. The fourth clause not only includes those -who gave a cordial. and active suppgrt to the hostile
government, but also those who yielded a reluctant obedience to
the existing order, established without their co-operation.
The statute is directed against parties who have offended in any
of the particulars embraced by these clauses. And its object is
to exclude them from the profession of the law, or at least from
-its practice in the courts of the United States. As the oath prescribed cannot be taken by these parties,.the act, as against them,
operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion. And
exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light
than as punishment for such conduct. The exaction of the oath
is the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon whom the
act is intended to operate, and instead of lessening, increases its
objectionable, character. All enactments of this kind partake of
the nature of bills of pains and penalties, and are subject to the
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constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder.
under which general designation they are included.
In the exclusion which the statute adjudges it imposes a punishment for some of the acts specified which were not punishable.
or may not have been punishable at the time they were committed :
and for other of the acts it adds a new punishment to that then
prescribed, and it is thus brought within the further inhibition of
the constitution against the passage of an ex post facto law. In
the case of Cummings v. State of Missouri, just decided, we
have had occasion to consider at length the meaning of a bill of
attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauses of the constitution forbidding their passage by the states, and it is unnecessary
to repeat here what we there said. A like prohibition is conlined in the constitution against enactments of this kind by
Congress; and the argument presented in that case against certain clauses of the Constitution of Missouri is equally applicable
to the Act of ,Congress under consideration in this case.
The profession.,of an attorney and counsellor is not like an
office created, by an Act of Congress, which depends for its continuance, its powers, and its emoluments upon the will of its
creator, and the possession of which may be burdened with any
conditions 'not. prohibited by the constitution. Attorneys and
counsellors are not officers of the United States; they are not
,elected_ or appointed in the manner prescribed by the constitution
for the election and appointment of such officers. They are officers of thecvourt, admitted as such by its order upon e'idence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.
Since the statute of 4 Henry IV., c. 18, it has been the practice
in England, and it has always been the practice in this country,
to obtain this evidence by an examination pf the parties. In this
court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court
of the states to which they respectively belong, for three years
preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of
the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement
of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair. The order of admission
is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for

288

EX PARTE GARLAND.

professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to
be heard has been afforded. Their admission or their exclusion
is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise
of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It
was so held by the Court of Appeals of New York in the matter
of the application of Cooper for admission (22 N. Y. 81):
"Attorneys and counsellors," said that court, 1 are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the 6ourts, and
the latter in perTorming this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions."
In Exparte Secombe, 19 How. 9, a mandamus to the SupremeCourt of the territory of Minnesota to vacate an order removing
an attorney and counsellor was denied by this court, on the ground
that the removal was a judicial act. "We are not aware of any
case," said the court, " where a mandamus was issued to an inferior tribunal commanding it to reverse or annul its decision where
the decision was in its nature a judicial act and within the scope
of its jurisdiction and discretion." And in the same case the
court observed that "it has been well settled by the rules and
practice of common-law courts that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed."
The attorney and counsellor being, by the solemn judicial act
of the cdurt, clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter
of grace and favor. The right which it confers upon him to
appear for suitors, and to argue causes, is something more than a,
mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the
command of the legislature. It is a right of which he can only
be deprived by the judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency.
The legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the
office, with which he must conform, as it may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of
the ordinary avocations of life. But to constitute a qualification
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the condition or thing prescribed must be attainable, in theory at
least, by every one. That which from the nature of things or the
past condition or conduct of the parties, cannot be attained by
every citizen, does not fall within the definition of the term. To
all those by whom it is unattainable it is a disqualification which
operates as a perpetual bar to the office. The question in this
case is not as to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications,
but whether that power has been exercised as a means for the
infliction of punishment, against the prohibition of the Constitution. That this result cannot be effected indirectly by a state
under the form of creating qualifications we have held in the case
of Cummings v. The State of Missouri,and the reasoning by which
that conclusion was reached applies equally to similar action on
the part of Congress.
These views are further strengthened by a consideration of the
effect of the pardon produced by the petitioner, and the nature of
the pardoning power of the President.
The Constitution provides that the President" shall have power
to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United
States, except incases of impeachment."--Art. H. sec. 2.
The power thus conferred is unlimited with the exception
stated. Itextends to every offence known to the law, and may
be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal
proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject
to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of
his pardon, or exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him, cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.
Such being the case, the inquiry arises as to the effect and
operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur.
A pardon reaches both the punishment, prescribed for the offence,
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offence. If granted before conviction it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon
conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction it removes
the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil
VOL. XV.-19
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rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not
restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others
in consequence of the conviction and judgment: 4 Blackstone
402; 6 Bacon's Abr., tit. Pardon; Hawkins, book 2, ch. 37,
§§ 84 and 54.
The pardon produced by the petitioner is a full pardon "for
all offences by him committed arising from participation, direct
or implied, in the rebellion," and is subject to certain conditions
which have been complied with. The effect of this pardon is to
relieve the petitioner from all penalties and disabilities attached
to the offence of treason, committed by his participation in the
rebellion. So far as that offence is concerned he is thus placed
beyond the reach of punishment of any kind. But to exclude
him, by reason of that offence, from continuing in the enjoyment
of a previously acquired right, is to enforce a punishment for that
offence notwithstanding the pardon. If such exclusion can be
effected by the exaction of an expurgatory oath covering the
offence, the pardon may be avoided, and that accomplished indirectly which cannot be reached by direct legislation. It is not
within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency. From the petitioner, therefore, the oath required by the act of January 24th,
1865, could not be exacted, even if that act were not subject to
any other objection than the one thus stated.
It follows from the views expressed that the prayer of the
petitioner must be granted.
And the amendment of the second rule of the court, which
-requires-the oath prescribed by the Act of January 24th, 1865,
to be taken by attorneys and counsellors,.having been unadvisedly
;adopted, must be rescinded.
And it is so ordered.
WAYNE, NELSON,
CHASF,

GRIER, and

0. J., MILLER,

SWAYNE,

In compliance with a very generally
,expressed desire, we have given a prominent place to the foregoing opinion
-atthe earliest practicable moment. We

JJ., concurred.
and DAVIS, JJ., dissented.

CLIFFORD,

do not intend to offer any comments
upon it,-though the dissent of f6ur judges
might seem to invite criticism or at leat
a very close scrutiny of the decision by
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a bare majority of one. The minority
delivered through Justice MIiLLER a
dissenting opinion, of which we regret
that we have not yet seen the official
text, but we presume the same ground
is taken, substantially, as that assumed
by Chief Justice CARTTER of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
in Ex parte 11agruder,which we print
post, p. 292. We propose, however, to
take this opportunity to notice briefly
one or two cases which, like the foregoing, possess a special interest at. this
time from their political as well as their
legal character, but which are too long
to be given entire.
I. The ease of CU3MINGS v. T
STATE Or Missoui was a writ of error
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which
brought up the consideration of the constitutionality of the test oath established
by the Constitution of Missouri, and
raised substantially the same question
as that in the principal case, except that
the Missouri test oath was far more
inquisitorial and severe than that prescribed by the Act of 1862, and was
established by a state constitution instead
of by Act of Congress. The court, by
-Justice FIELD, examined very critically
the provisions of the oath, which in its
terms, inquired not only into the acts,
but the sympathies and desires in reference to the rebellion, of those for whom
it was prescribed. The learned judge
then proceeded to show that this oath
was not merely the establishment of a
test of qualifications for certain offices or
professions, but was in its nature essentially punitive, and, therefore, contrary
to the provision of the Constitution of
the United States, which declares that
no state shall pass a bill of attainder or
ex post facto law. The judgment of the
Supreme Court of 'Missouri was therefore
reversed.
IT. In AVERA v. ROBERTsox and other
eases, argued and decided together in the
Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial

District of Mississippi, the question was
raised of the validity of contracts based
on Confederate Treasury Notes. The
court (Hon. ALEx. M. CLAYTON, J.),
considered very elaborately the status of
the late Confederacy as a government'
de facto, recognised as such and as a
belligerent, not only by foreign nations,
but by the United States Government
itself. The opinion then shows that on
the fall of the Confederacy the United
States, as conqueror, had full power
over the laws and property of the people
of the conquered states, but that the
Government had, in accordance with the
usage of nations, left untouched most
of the municipal laws of the Southern
States regulating private rights, but had
swept away and ignored the whole
political system and laws of the overthrown Confederacy. The result of this
argument we give in the words of the
court :-" Theissuance of treasury notes
by the Congress of the Confederate
States was done by virtue of the war
power in the Constitution, and was an
exercise of a belligerent right. I have
so held at this court in regard to the
legal tender notes of the United States.
Indeed, almost every act of the Confederate Congress related to the conduct of
the war, and to the means necessary to
give it the greatest aid and efficiency.
These all sunk with the Confederacy.
The political and civil rights of the
people of the South depend on the provisions of the new or altered system, in
the absence of treaty stipulations on the
subject. The abolition of the whole
rebel debt, as it is called by the superior
power-the extinction of the government which created it-and the annulment of all the laws which ever gave it
vitality, make it impossible to recover
upon the notes themselves. And this
condemnation adheres to them even in a
secondary transaction. Whatever the
abstract right may be, a remedy could
not be administered by a court, organized
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by permission of the conqueror, and
bound by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
"9The same reasoning applies with all
its force to the suit brought to recover
the amount agreed to be paid for a substitute to serve in the Confederate army;
and the same result must follow. In
neither of these cases can a suit be sustained.
"1But the statutes passed by the legislature of this state to suspend the operation of the statutes of limitation during
the war, were in my estimation valid
and binding. They were municipal

laws, affecting private property only,
and have not been touched by the conquering power.
"1The foregoing views derive confirmation from the fact, that when a
statute is repealed, it must be considered
as to all transactions in fieri (unexecuted), as closed, or as never haring
had existence. But when there is an
exception in favor of existing rights or
remedies, or where rights hve become
vested and perfected, under the old law,
the repealed statute as to these must still
be considered in force : Blackwell on
J. T. M.
Tax Titles 553."

qupreme Court of te District of Oohimbia.
EX PARTE MAGRUDER.
This court has an inherent right to regulate the terms upon which attorneys shall
be admitted zo its bar. It had, therefore, the right to prescribe as a qualification
for admission to its bar, the taking of an oath similar to that established by the
Act of Congress of July 2d 1562, for officers of the United States.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Bx parte Gartand,
that the Act of Congress of January 24th 1865, is unconstitutional, does not entitle
a person to admission to the bar of this court without taking the oath prescribed
by the rules of the court.

This was a motion on the application of Allen B. Magruder
and others, for admission to the bar of this court, connected
with a motion to rescind the rule which provides that each applicant for admission to the bar shall, before being admitted, take
'an oath, similar to that prescribed by the Act of Congress of
July 2d 1862, for officers of the United States.
Magruder,P. P., and Bradley, for the motion.
.EochTotten,

contra.

CARTTER, C. J.-The consideration of the, subject in the order
of the application suggests the inquiry whether the applicant is
eligible to admission irrespective of the oath. His history in this
connection, as rendered by himself, makes him a citizen of the
District of Columbia immediately antecedent to the outbreak of
the rebellion, and a member of the bar of the former Circuit
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Court, and as such attorney under the obligation of the oath which
he took on the 12th of December 1857, to.support the Constitution of the United States.
It also appears, from his own statement, that about the time of
the inauguration of the rebellion, and before the secession of Vir-'
ginia, he transferred himself from this jurisdiction to that state,
where he became an officer in the rebel army, as such binding
himself, under oath, to do all in his power to destroy this
government.
The reason he assigns for the violation of his oath to support
the Constitution of the United States, as an attorney of the
former Circuit Court, as we understand him, is that he was a
native of Virginia, and owed to Virginia a paramount fealty.
The mere statement of his case, as given by himself, would seem
to mak6 it impossible for any Federal court to incorporate him
among its officers.
The assumption of state sovereignty and the paramount duty
of the citizen to the state is old as a pretence in justification for
resistance to Federal authority, having been chiefly used as a
means to that end; but as an honest conviction of intelligent
judgment it has been entertained but by few. The proposition
that a part is greater than the whole, and that the government
of the United States only existed at the will of one of its members,
is incapable of belief, and simply argues that the government of
the United States never existed, or, if it had existence, had not
vitality for self-preservation. The disqualification of. the applicant for admission is made more significant, if possible, by his
disinclination and failure to say that in taking the oath to support
the Constitution of the United States in contemplation of admission to the bar of this court, he would regard it as binding him
and his conscience in paramount duty to this government. The
essential absurdity of the position, that a state in conflict with
the Federal power is greater than the nation, and duty to the
state greater than duty to the nation, which was put forth prior
to the rebellion, chiefly as a speculative means to the destruction
of the Federal Government, seems still to afflict him. It will be
perceived, from this view of his case, that if the oath in question
did not exist, it would still be impossible for the court to give the
applicant admission to this bar.
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This leads us to the consideration of the motion to rescind the
first rule of this court, adopted March 23d 1863.
We understand the motion to be based substantially upon the
assumption that the oath prescribed by that rule is unconstitutional, that its unconstitutionality has been determined by the
Supreme Court, and that that determination is mandatory upon
the judgment of this court; that it is unconstitutional because it
is ex Post facto, and in the nature of a penalty. It is a fundamental rule, that to authorize a court to pronounce a law unconstitutional the fault of the law should be clear, and its violation
of the constitution unembarrassed by doubt. Deference to the
deliberations and judgment of the law-making and co-ordinate
branch of the government not only recommends this rule, but
makes it imperative. Up to the time of the publication of the
recent opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court, this court,
from the 'time of the adoption of the rule, has entertained no
doubt of its constitutionality, or of its propriety and necessity.
The only Aoubt now existing in this regard has been raised by
'the expression of the opinion of the majority of that court.
It is said to be ex postfacto and in-the nature of a penalty.
Let us inquire. The lpenalty for what act? A law after what
act? Does it propose to inflict an additional penalty for the
treason committed, or simply to leave the traitor where the
treason left him-in the enjoyment of all the ordinary and natural
estate of the citizen ? The ex post facto penalty contemplated by
law is a new penalty prescribed for previous crimes-a new punishment for an old transgression. Does this rule do that? If it
does, it is by withholding a privilege that the party never had,
and that does not pertain to the'estate of ordinary citizenship.
The fact. in the premises which it is objected is ex post facto is
the office of attorney, with its privileges and immunities as a
member of this bar-a fact which the party never had, and is now
for the first time seeking. The condition to the enjoyment of the
office complained of here, instead of being after the fact, precedes
it, and is really complained of as an obstacle to it. The oath,
instead of being a. penalty, is simply among the evidences of fitness
for the enjoyment of the estate in piospect, which, among other
tests, this court has seen fit to impose for the protection of the
morale of the bar and the integrity of the government.
This view of the nature and constitutional character of this rule
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is sufficiently satisfactory to our mind without the aid even of the
acknowledged constitutional power of Congress to make retroactive laws.
It is unnecessary to discuss in the light of this argument the
effect of the pardon, inasmuch as it is not .part of the office of a
pardon to create in a criminal new rights disconnected with his
crime, and which he did not before possess.
But it is insisted that the unconstitutionality of this rule has
been determined by the Supreme Court, which determination is
mandatory upon this court. In ascertaining what the Supreme
Court has determined, the first guide to judgment is the consideration of the case that the Supreme Court had before them. If the
case before them defines the limits of their opinion, that court has
not decided the case before us. The case decided by the Supreme
Court was the case of an existing member of their bar. The case
before us is the case of the application of parties for admission to
the bar. The case in the Supreme Court was a privilege in
possession. The case before us is a privilege in prospect. The
decision in the Supreme Court involved a dismemberment from
the bar. The decision here involves admission to the bar. It
may be said of the case in the Supreme Court that the pardon of
the President, so far as the legal disabilities of Garland were concerned, removed them. It cannot be said that a similar pardon
in the case before us would create the privilege. If the law
expounded by the majority of the Supreme Court is simply an
exposition of the case they had before them, it is not analogous
with the case at bar; and it may be well questioned whether it
would be authority beyond the limits of the legitimate issue presented. Ouiside of the issue, at most, it could only be considered
as the expression of opinion by eminent judges.
The question that remains to be considered in this connection
is, conceding the decision of the Supreme Court to be in point,
whether it is mandatory upon the judgment of this court. This
question is to be determined by the legal relation of this tribunal
to that. To make their decision mandatory upon the judgment
of this court in the strict definition of their authority, they must
have the power to execute it upon the deliberation of this court.
The only power they possess in this behalf is given by Act of
Congress, and regulated by the right of appeal, and confessedly
does not extend to the subject under consideration. If there was
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any doubt upon -this point, that doubt has been removed by the
repeated decisions of that eminent tribunal. In Ex parte Burr,
9 Wheat. 529, Chief Justice MARSHALL, delivering the opinion
of the court, said:" On one hand the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be
lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is
extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be
maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects some controlling power, some discretion, ought to reside in the court.
"This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation
and judgment, but it must be exercised, and no other tribunal
can decide in a case of removal from the bar with the same means
of information as the court itself. If there be a revising tribunal
which possesses controlling authority, that tribunal will always
feel the delicacy of interposing its authority, and would do so
only in a plain case."
In Ex parte John L. Tiflinghast, 4 Pet. 108, the court said:
"When, on a former occasion, a mandamus was applied for to
restore Mr. Tillinghast to the roll of counsellors to the 'District
Court, this court refused to interfere with the matter, not considering the same within their cognisance."
And in Ex parte Secome, 19 How. 13, Chief Justice TANEY
said: "In the case of TillinSgast v. Conkling, which came
before this court in January Term 1829, a similar motion was
overruled by the court. The case is not reported; but a brief
written opinion remains on the files of the- court, in which the
.ourt says, that the motion is overruled upon the ground that it
had not jurisdiction in the case. The.removal of the attorney
and counsellor in that case took place in a District Court of the
United States, exercising the Power of a'Circuit Court; and in a
court of that character, the relations between the court and the
attorneys and counsellors who practise in it, and their respective
rights and duties, are regulated by the common law; and it has
been well settled by the common rules,and practice of the commonlaw courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers as an attorney and
counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
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After these repeated decisions this question may be said to be
res judicata.
The inherent right of each court to regulate its own rules of
practice, including the terms of admission of attorneys to and
dismissals from the bar, has come down to us unquestioned
through the long life of the common law. With regard to this
court, and its inherent power of making its rules of admission to
and dismissal from the bar, Congress, the law-maker of this court,
has not only confirmed the common-law power of the court,
hitherto deemed almost necessary to the existence of the court,
but made it the duty of the court, in the organic act of its creation, to exercise that power, leaving the court in its discretion
the sole tribunal to pass upon the question, subject-only to the
penalty of impeachment for the abuse of the power. These considerations are conclusive of the assumption that the opinion
referred to is authority with this court. While we deny to this
decision of the Supreme Court the office of such authority, we
acknowledge the potency of that tribunal as the instructor of
judgment, and if it had united its great wisdom in the pronunciation of 'opinion invalidating the rule in controversy, we should
feel disposed to bow to it.
But it comes to us as advisory, and we must receive it upon the
conditions upon which it is sent. These conditions in the way of
advice are that a majority of one of that court counsels the condemnation of the rule, while a minority of one less than the
majority counsels its support, leaving this court to form its own
opinion without any substantial aid from the decision.
If we were to adopt the conclusion of the majority, it would be
at the expense of condemning a law of Congress in defiance of
the rule of judgment already referred to, and substantially upon
the opinion of a single justice of the Supreme Court, for the judgment, after all, weighed in the balance, is reduced to the opinion
of one justice, a result, however binding, not very impressive of
wisdom when applied to the condemnation of a law.
In January Term 1835, the Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice MARSHALL, refused to take up the cases of The Mayor of
New York v. George Hiln, and George Bricer v. The Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 9 Peters 85, because the court was
"not full," in consequence of the resignation of Justice DuvAIL.
This controversy of judicial opinion, largely attributable to
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political excitement, demonstrates to our judgment that the question in controversy is so involved with political considerations as
to render it eminently proper that it should be referred back to
the political power of the nation, and the law-making power which
created it be consulted in its modification or repeal.
Without suggesting what would be our judgment as to the modification of the rule, or whether any, let it be sufficient to say that
it is a question for legislation, and not for adjudication.
The motions are denied.
The other judges concurred.'

Supreme Court of Pennaylvan'a.
THORNTON CONROW v.GEORGE M. STROUD.
Where a party, at the trial of a cause, takes an exception to the ruling or to the
charge of the court, and puts the same in writing before the jury deliberate, the
judge is bound to seal the exceptions, without regard to their nature or materiality.
If he decline to seal them, a writ under the statute of Westminster 2d will be /

awarded by this court, commanding him to confess or deny the exceptions, and if
his return confess them he will be compelled to seal them;

THE proceedings were commenced by the presentation of the
following petition, duly sworn to :"The petition of Thornton Conrow respectfully showeth, that
he is the plaintiff in error in a certain case, entitled Conrow v.
Schloss, etc., and that he has sought by said writ to bripg before
your Honors certain errors committed by the Honorable George
M. Stroud, an Associate Justice of the District Court for the
City and County of Philadelphia, in -a case between Hiram
Schloss, Lazarus and Simon Schloss, trading as Schloss Brothers,
as plaintiffs, and your petitioner as defendant, to September
Term 1864, and No. 586, which was tried before him on the 12th
day of November 1866, by a jury duly impannelled.
"That the said Honorable George M. Stroud did charge the jury
in said case as is set forth in the exhibit marked A,' and that the
counsel of your petitioner, before said jury deliberated on said
SWym, J., delivered a concurring opinion, for which we regret that we hare
not room. EDs. A. L. R.
2
The charge is omitted as not material in the view taken by the court.
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case, and in Their presence, did except to said charge as is specifically set forth in Exhibit B, and the said Honorable George M.
Stroud did note said exceptions as the counsel for your petitioner
therein did then and there put and make the same.
"1Andyour petitioner further showeth that, pursuant to the rules
of the court of which the said Honorable George M. Stroud is a
justice, the counsel for your petitioner, on the 23d day of November, and within ten days after the verdict was rendered in
said case, did present a formal bill of exceptions to the said
Honorable George M. Stroud, with the exceptions as made at the
time of the trial and so reduced to writing as aforesaid, therein
written, and did request the said Honorable George M. Stroud
to affix his seal thereto, which the said Honorable George M.
Stroud did then and there refuse to do.
"And youf' petitioner further showeth, that on the 29th day of
December 1866, the counsel for your petitioner did again present
said bill to the said Honorable George M. Stroud, and did again
request him to affix his seal thereto, and he did then and there
refuse so to do.
"And your petitioner further showeth, that the refusal of the
said Honorable George M. Stroud to affix his seal to the said
exceptions is to the grievous and manifest injury of your
petitioner, and against the statute in such case made and provided.
"He therefore prays your Honors to award a writ conformably
to the statute in such cases made and provided, directed to the
said Honorable George M. Stroud, commanding him to appear
at a certain day, either to confess or deny the matters herein
set forth, and, if he confess the same, to affix his seal to said
exceptions."
The exceptions were quite numerous, but the two following
only are material, being those which were chiefly relied upon at
the argument,:"Defendant excepts: 1st. Because, in the recapitulation of the
evidence, the learned judge gave undue weight and prominence
to those portions thereof which bore against defendant; and
omitted, or alluded slightingly to, those portions which bore in
his favor.
2d. Because the charge, as a whole, was calculated to mislead
the jury."
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Upon this petition the court awarded a special writ under the
Statute of Westminster 2d, returnable at the next motion day.'
Upon that day the respondent made the following return:
This respondent, by protestation, not owning or allowing any
of the matters of the petition to be true, as they are therein
alleged, but waiving, so far as it is in his power so to do, all aud
every objection to the jurisdiction of your Honors in respect to
the prayer of the petition, shows and offers to the consideration
of your HonorsThat the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia is a court of special jurisdiction. * * *
That the statute of Westminster 2, chap. 31, is the only authoIAs this case is believed to be almost unique, we give the writ, which was
adapted from the ancient writ found in the Registrum BrevliuR, and was as
follows:CITY AND CoUNTYr Os PH LADELPHIA,

O WIT:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Hon. George M. Stroud, Greeting:
Whereas, by statute, among other things, it is provided, that in any suit before
the justices, where an exception is taken, if the said justice before whom the same
is taken refuse to allow the same, and, the party inaking the exception puts the
same in writing, and requires the justice to put his seal thereto, in testimony of
the same, if he refuse so to put his seal, it shall be affixed as in said statute is set
forth.
his petition before the justices of
And whereas, one Thornton Conrow has filed
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, complaining that, lately, in a certain suit in
the District Court for the city and- county of Philadelphia, to September Term,
1864, and number 536, before you, the said George M. Stroud, between Hiram
Schloss, Lazarus Schloss, and Simon Schloss, trading as Schloss Brothers, and
the said Thornton Conrow, various exceptions were taken and alleged to your
charge ; and those exceptions have been put in writing, for that you refuse to allow
the same, and have been repeatedly required and prayed to affix your seal to those
exceptions, according to the form of the aforesaid statute. Yet so it is, that you
have 'objected -and still do object and refuse to affix your seal to the aforesaid
exceptions, to the grievous injury and manifest prejudice of 'the said Thornton
Conrow; and the said Thornton Conrow did pray said justices to provide a remedy
for him.
And because we are desirous that the aforesaid statute be strictly observed, and
that justice be done to the said Thornton Conrow in the premises, we command
you, if so it be, that on or before Saturday the 26th day of January 1867, you
affix your seal to the aforesaid exceptions thus had before you in the aforesaid suit,
by the aforesaid Thornton Conrow, in writing, according to the form of the statute
aforesaid. And hereof fail not, under the penalty in such cases impending.
"Witness the Honorable GEonGE W. WooDwAXnD, Chief Justice of said Court,
this fifteenth day of January, A. D. 1867.
JAxss Ross Sxownrm, [amL.]
u s.stamp.-

cents. J

Prothonotaryj.
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rity whereby a bill of exceptions is matter of right to be required
by any person impleaded before the judges of the said District
Court, and that by the true intent and meaning of said statute,
the pretended bill of exceptions mentioned in the petition ought
not to have been allowed by the respondent, but, on the contrary,,
it was and is his duty to refuse to seal the same.
That the Statute of Westminster 2, before and at the time of
the settlement of this country by colonists under the charter
granted to William Penn, had received a judicial construction,
that a bill of exceptions should be taken and allowed only upon
some point of law, either in admitting or denying evidence, or a
challenge, or some matter of law arising upon facts not denied or
sufficiently proved, in which either party had been overruled by
the court. This proposition was asserted in the argument of
Bridgeman v. ffolt, Show. Parl. Cas. 120, A. D-. 1693, as familiar
learning in that day, and also by Sir William Blackstone, 3 Corn.
372, and in Buller's Nisi Prius 310.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex, parta Crane,
5 Peters 190, a case presenting no other matter for adjudication,
denied the right of a party to a general exception to the charge
of the judge presiding at the trial, and required a distinct specification of the point or points of law, in the ruling of which the
judge was supposed to have erred. And-, to impart to this judgment the highest efficacy,, the same court shortly afterwards
"adopted the following rule of court: "That hereafter th6 judges
of the Circuit and District Courts do not allow any bill of exceptions which shall contain the charge of the court at large to the
jury in trials at common law upon any general exception to the
whole of such charge; but that the party excepting be required
to state distinctly the several matters of law in such charge to
which he excepts, and that such matters of law, and those only,
be inserted in the bill of exceptions an*d allowed by the court."
Our sister states have given the highest sanction to the utility
and necessity of this doctrine. In at least sixteen of these.
express legislation exists, requiring in clear and positivelerms
that in bills of exceptions a specification shall be made of.the
points of law in the decision of which the inferior tribunals are
alleged to have erred; thus at once embodying the substance of
the British statute, and adopting the exposition which the courts
of that kingdom had placed upon it. In the remaining states, it
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is confidently believed that no decision can be adduced contravening in the slightest degree the received construction of the
Statute of Westminster, or any intimation of a practice at variance
with its requirements. In Connecticut the statute appears to be
yet in force, and the same judicial construction has been given to
it which it had received before the colonization of the State.
Wadsworth v. Sandford, Kirby 456, A. D. 1788; Watson v.
Watson, 10 Conn. 75; Picket v. Allen, Ibid. 146. In the
Supreme Court and in the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
York, the same doctrine is maintained, as may be seen in the
opinions of" Chancellor KENT in Van Gorden v. Jackson, 5
Johns. 467, and in Prierv. Jfackson, 8 Johns. 387 ; and of Justice
WOODWORTH in Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cowen 639; and of Chancellor WALWORTH in Law v. Aferrill8, 6 Wend. 274. To the

same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Uoxe v. Field,1, Green 216, on the statute of that state, which,
with a slight verbal addition, is a transcript of the Statute of
Westminster. And, in short, wherever trial by jury and courts
of error have a place in the same system of jurisprudence, and
the forms of the common law are observed, and a bill of exceptions is the prescribed mode of bringing under revision the proceedings of the inferior tribunal, a specification of the alleged
errors in such tribunal has been, it is believed, always deemed an
essential requirement at the hands of.the complaining party.
The respondent submits to the consideration of your honors
that to the generality of this remark, the decisions of our own
courts furnish no exception, although it is freely admitted that,
in regard to bills of exceptions, as well as in many other matters,
a very loose practice has, to a great extent, obtained; as, for
.example) in Thomas v. Wright, 9 S. & R. 90, where, it appears,
the notes of the evidence of four counsel in the cause, together
with the notes of the judge, were referred to in the bill of exceptions instead of an insertion of the appropriate evidence, or a
statement of facts settled by the counsel or court. And our reports
furn1'h traces of very extraordinary pretensions on the part of
counsel in regard to the proceedings of inferior courts, in connectiou with the revising superintendence of this honorable court.
Thus in one case, Stewart v. Huntingdon Bank, 11 S. & R. 267,
it was made the subject of a bill of exceptions, that the judge
refused to suspend the trial of the cause until the bill of excep-
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tions was drawn up in form and sealed by one of the judges; and
in Afunderback v. Lutz, 14 S. & R. 125, the court was moved
for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding the judge who had presided on the trial below, to furnish
his notes of the evidence, for the purpose of having them- trans-'
cribed for the use of counsel in reference to the bill of exceptions
or its substitute, under the Act of 24th February, 1806. But no
case has yet arisen which required of the revising courts any
action or decision directly on this question. On two occasions,
at least, we have the opinion of Mr. Justice DUNCAN, concurring
in the fullest manner with the construction of the Statute of
Westminster, already so frequently adverted to; the one in Thomas v. Wright, 9 S. & R. 91, the other in Stfford v. Walker,
12 Ibid. 196; and in Beigart v. B maker, 14 Ibid. 124, this
honorable - court, consisting then, as now, of five judges, pronounced through the late Chief Justice TmGnMA, an opinion in
respect to the construction of the Act of Assembly of the 24th
February, 1806, which, it is confidently submitted to your honors,
is equivalent to a full recognition of the principle which the
respondent has asserted in refusing to, allow the pretended bill
of exceptions, alleged by the petition to have been exhibited and
required of him to be allowed. It is there decided that the true
meaning of the Act of Assembly mentioned was, that when a
judge delivered an opinion on matter of law, he should, if
.requested, reduce his opinion, with hi& reasons for it, to writing,
and file it of record. This, it is said, in that instance, !"was done
as to several specified points on which an opinion was requested
by the defendant's counsel. But this it seems was not deemed
sufficient. The judge was requested to reduce his whole charge
to the jury to writing, and file it. There is nothing in the Act
of Assembly which authorizes such a request, and the judge was
very right in declining to comply Kith it." And the reasons
which are there assigned by the court demonstrate, in the most
convincing manner, the impropriety of such a requisition, whether
under the Act of Assembly which requires the opinion of the judge
to be filed of record, or upon the statute of Westminster, where the
matter complained of is to be exhibited through the medium of a
bill of exceptions. "In a charge to the jury," says the Chief
Justice, "the judge sums up the evidence and lays it before
them, with such observations of his own as he thinks pertinent.
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I believe no judge reduces his whole charge to writing before it
is given, and, indeed, he could not do it without ruinots delay,
and after it is given it would be impossible for a man of the most
tenacious memory to recollect all that he had said on the facts of
the cause. And even if it were possible, it would be improper to
burthen the record with a quantity of unnecessary matter. It is the
business of the counsel who requests an opinion to be filed to specify
it. Several opinions on matter of law may be delivered in one charge.
Some of these may be objected to, and some not; but at all events
the judge should be informed what the opinion is which he is
desired to reduce to writing, &c., and then it is his duty to file
that opinion, with his reasons, and no more."
And the respondent would, in conclusion, on this branch of the
present inquiry, bring to your honors' notice the strong expression of his opinion by Chief Justice GIBSON, in Wolverton v. The
Commontwealth, 7 S. & R. 278. "No judge," he says, "1ought,
in justice to his own reputation as a lawyer, or to the rights of
suitors, to allow any bill of exceptions which does not contain the
very point decided,.and nothing else. The statute of 13 Edw. 1,
ch. 81, says: ' Where one impleaded before any of the justices,
alleges an -exception, praying they will sign it, and if they will
not, if he that alleges the exception write the same, and requires
that the justices will put to it their seals, they shall do so; and
if one will not, another shall.' "Then surely the party taking
thw exception, is bound to write it exactly as he alleges it."
And the respondent further shows to your honors, that nearly
a quarter of a century ago, the District Court for the City and
County of Philadelphia adopted and promulgated the following
rule of court, which has been in force ever since, to wit: "Either
party excepting to the charge of the court to the jury, shall,
before rendition of the verdict, state distinctly the several matters
of law in such charge to which he excepts; and no general exception to the whole of the charge shall be allowed by the court, but
the exceptions to the matter in.law so distinctly stated, and those
only shall be allowed in the bill of exceptions."
And the respondent shows to your honors, that immediately
after the charge had been delivered to the jury in the case of
Schloss Brothers v. Conrow, Mr. Earle, one of the defendant's
counsel, came in front of the Bench, and said he desired to make
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some exceptions to the charge, and thereupon handed to the
respondent a half-sheet of cap paper, or it may be a whole one,
on which were written what purported to be detached expressions
of the charge. Respondent read the same, and remarked that
he saw nothing in them which could be properly denominated
matters of law.
Mr. Earle then took the paper away, and some time afterwards,
a short time, respondent thinks, but cannot speak with certainty,
he returned with another paper, on which was written, "1Defendant excepts, Because, in the recapitulation of the evidence, the
learned judge gave undue weight and prominence to those portions thereof which bore against defendant, and omitted or alluded
slightly to those portions which bore in his favor."
2. "Because the charge as a whole was calculated to mislead
the jury." On this paper respondent wrote, at Mr. Earle's
request, which was in accordance with respondent's usual practice, "1Defendant's exceptions," G. M2.S. And the respondent
fully admits that in this forim, the same exceptions were made and
may be so taken and regarded.
And the respondent saith furthermore, in regard to these
alleged and pretended exceptions, that. neither of them specifies
or states any matter of law or any. matter to be rightly contained
in a bill of exceptions, reviewable in a court of error, but that
the same should according to the course of the common law have
been addressed to the sound discretion of the judges of the District Court, on an application for a new trial, and not otherwise.
And as to the second, it amounts to a general exception to the
whole charge, which exception is at variance with the common
law, and forbidden by the rule of court, hereinbefore contained
and set forth.
And as to the other pretended exceptions, consisting of twentyfour sentences, alleged to.have been- uttered. by the respondent
in his charge to the jury, respondent says, that whether the same
be taken, singly or together, or in any possible permutation, they
exhibit na matters of law, and ought not, therefore, to be allowed
in the bill of exceptions. Whether or not such sentences were
,uttered by the respondent, he is unable to say, but a comparison
of the same with the imputed charge, contained in exhibit A,
shows a want of correspondence between the one and the other.
Nevertheless, that nothing may stand in the way of your Honors
VOL. XV.-20
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in examining the -complaint of the plaintiff in error, respondent is
villing and consents that each of the pretended exceptions may
be taken as properly alleged. And so in regard to the charge,
as set forth in exhibit A, respondent denies that the same in
language and form was ever delivered by him; yet for the purpose of the present inquiry, and for no other purpose whatever,
he is willing and consents that it may be taken as true in matter
and substance.
And the respondent shows, and offers to the consideration
of your Honors, that inasmuch as a court of error concerns
itself with alleged errors in matter of law in the proceedings
of inferior tribunals, and not with the general merits of the controversy between the parties as disclosed by the evidence, the
rule of court which requires a specification, on the trial, of the
matters of law contained in the charge, to which a party excepts,
grants to such party every advantage which is called for by a
regard to the interest of such party; and that the only difference
between the requirement of such a r'ule and the allowance of a
general exception to the charge has reference to the supposed
convenience of the excepting party and nothing more. For the
rule of court, adverted to, allows any and every matter of law
alleged to have been erroneously stated to the jury to be
excepted to;- and by a rule of your honorable body, the plaintiff
in error is required to make a written specification of the particular errors which he assigns and on which he intends to rely.;
so that the only difference is whether the party shall make his
specification at one time or another.
And the respondent would further present to your Honors'
consideration that of necessity from the constitution of a court
,of errors, it is imposed upon such court not unfrequently to
reverse judgments from very small faults in the .charge, such as
arise from the use of language, in its nature imperfect, or the
statement of a proposition or principle of law too broadly, and
the like; whilst, at the same time, it is quite obvious that such
minute error has very slight or no bearing at all on the merits
of the cause, and in all probability has had no influence in pro.
ducing the verdict.
A similar state of circumstances is adverted to and deplored
by Chief Justice GiBSON, in his opinion delivered in Wolverton
v. The Commonwealth, 7 S. & R.-27-8. On a motion for a new

CONROW v. STROUD.

trial, bach a condition of things is usually disregarna.,. Ta. lt
7
v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, is an example of this kind. Being on a
motion for a new trial, the error in the charge was deemed unimportant. On a writ of error the judgment would have been
reversed. Yet had the subject of objection been mentioned to'
the judges before the rendition of the verdict, its force would
have been perceived, and the mistake corrected; and yet the
result of the trial not affected by it.
The specification required by the rule of court is calculated to
produce, and has produced the like beneficial effect. The supposed error, on being pointed out, is at once rectified, the jury
properly instructed, unequivocal language substituted for what
might probably mislead, a judicious verdict rendered, and a writ
of error saved.
And respondent further shows, that having been informed by
petitioner's counsel that it is his purpose to question the power of
the District Court to make the rule of practice already set forth,
respondent would call to your Honors' attention that in establishing this court, as appears from the preamble of the Act of Assembly of March 30th 1811, a leading motive was to secure a speedy
and effectual administration of the law in the trial of causes, and
that by section 4th of the same act, the court is empowered and
enjoined "1to make such regulations of practice as may most
facilitate the progress of justice."
And respondent further shows that the District Court has at
different times made sundry rules, designed to effect an easy and
speedy trial of causes, two of which, at least, have been adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court, and the power of the District
Court to make such rules sustained, and the exercise thereof
approved. The rules themselves here alluded to, and the approval
of them, will be found reported in 5 W. & S. 176, Odenlheimer
v. Stokes, to which, for convenience, .the respondent begs leave

to refer.

The respondent, confiding on the justness and force of the suggestions already made, in conclusion, nevertheless, shows and
offers to the consideration of your Honors, that the allowing of a
general exception to the charge, or the requiring of a specification
of the errors alleged, is a matter which concerns the practice of
the inferior court, and, therefore, upon settled principles well
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known to your Honors, cannot be the subject of revision at all by
a Court of Error.
Upon this, as well as upon the other considerations submitted
to your Honors, the respondent submits that the prayers of the
petition of saild Thornton Conrow be denied.
To this return the petitioner filed the following exceptions:I. The said George M. Stroud hath confessed the said petition
to be true, but hath not affixed his seal to said bill, and so made
return to said writ as thereby commanded.
II. The said George M. Stroud refused to seal said bill because
the exceptions were directed to the whole charge, without showing
that said exceptions could have been otherwise put.'
HI. The said George M. Stroud refused to seal said bill
because of a rule of the District Court, which can only afply to
such a charge as is separable in its character.
IV. The said George M. Stroud declines to seal the exception,
"because the charge, as a whole, was calculated to mislead the
jury," for the reason that the same is at variance with the common law and forbidden by a rule of the District Court, which, so
far as the alleged conflict with the law is involved, is exclusively
for the Court of Error, and, so far as the rule of court is involved,

is wholly immaterial.
V. That the said George M. Stroud assumes that the sentences
to the number of twenty-four, which were the subject of exception,
exhibit no matter of law, without showing to the court the whole
evidence in the case tried, that the Court of Error may judge if
this be so.
VI. That the said George M. Stroud does not state, that at the
time the said several exceptions were made, he informed the
^counsel that the same would not be thereafter sealed.
VII. The return is a statement of the facts, argumentatively,
and with qualification, when the writ required plain, certain, and
unqualified denial or confession.
David W. Sellers, for the exceptions.
The exceptions assume that the respondent has confessed that
the petition is true, and raise the question, if his failure to seal
is justified by the views set forth in the return.
They further assume, that if it be confessed that an, exception
was put in writing which the judge should seal, that this is a duty
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which will be enforced by mandamus. It is only in case of a
return, which denies the facts in such a manner that an action
will lie thereon, that the proceedings end with the return.
A court, having appellate jurisdiction, will compel by mandamus the sealing of a bill, when a bill should be sealed: .Ex parte
Crane, 5 Peters 190.
The writ founded on the statute provides a specific remedy for
a suitor if a judge declines to seal an exception, and it is for this
reason that the writ of mandamus has not applied where the statute
is in force: Man v. Drexel, 6 W. & S. 9 ; Bridgeman. v.
Holt, Shower's Parl. "Cases 120.
Because the statute of Westminster is not- obligatory on the
courts of the United States, a mandamus.was adjudged to be the
proper remedy to oblige the sealing of a bill in the court below:
ET parte Crane, 5 Peters 190. This writ on the statute is
entirely mandatory, and is so regarded: Lessee v. Bank of
Indiana, 1 Wallace 599.
What, then, is the mandate of the statute and of the writ?
Simply, that the judge appear either to co2fes or de4y, and if
he confess, to qffix his seat.
The words of the statute are: "If he that alleges the exception
write the same, the justice shall seal."
What has the respondent done ? He has confessed the facts to
.be so, but does not answer that he has affixed his seal. In other
words, he disobeys the writ.
Has he confessed ? Speaking of th general charge, he says:
"Respondent denies that the same, in language and form, was
ever delivered by him; yet, for the purpose of the present inquiry,
and for no other purpose whatever, he is willing, and consents
that it may be taken as true in matter and substance."
When it is remembered that a judge of the District Court is
not bound to reduce his charge to writing, all that he can reasonably ask is, that the statement of his charge shall be true in matter and in substance.
Why not affix the seal ? The duty to do so, if confession of
the facts be made, is peremptory, and no excuse for non-compliance is admissible.
On this point, it is submitted that the learning on manidamus is
entirely applicable, and no case can be found in which there is a
peremptory command to do a certain thing, in which anything but
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obedience will answer: The Queen v. Mayor,1 Gale & Davison
728 (1841); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 12 Casey 263.
But it is submitted, that if a judge mislead a jury by the whole
charge, it is error in Pennsylvania; and how can this court know
if the charge excepted to did this, without a sealed bill containing the evidence ?
It has been held by a continuous train of decisions in Pennsylvania, that it is error in a judge, where there has been no specific
instruction asked for; so to charge a jury as to confine their
attention to one view of a case when there is more than one which
they should'consider: Garrett v. Gonter, 6 Wright 146; Siegel
v. Louderbaugh, 5 Barr 490. For a misdirection judgment will
be reversed, though no instruction be requested: Phweni Insurance Co. v. Pratt, 2 Binn. 308; Beef v. Rapp, 3 W. & S. 21;
Bank v. Foster, 6 Watts 310.
If, as a whole, the charge was calculated to mislead the jury,
it is error: Reeves v. Railroad,6 Casey 460 ; Bovard v. Christ,
2 Harris 267; Nieman v. Ward, W. & S. 68 ; Armstrong v.
Hupey, 12 S. & R. 315.
A review of the authorities cited by respondent will confirm
the line of argument herein suggested.
In Bridgeman v. .olt, Showers's Parl. Cas. 111, it was said:
"The writ recites a surmise of an exception taken and overruled,
and it follows vobis prwcipimus, quod si ita est tune sigillavestra
ayponatis. Si ita is conditional: if the bill be true and duly
rendered, then this writ; and if it be returned, quod non ita eat,
then an action for a false return, and thereupon the surmise will
be tried, and if found to be so-damages; and upon such a
recovery a peremptory writ commanding the same."
It is submitted that this is an authority full on every point for
the petitioner in this case.
That a mandamus will not lie in the first instance to procure
a sealed bill is clear; but that it will, if there be confession of
the facts or recovery notwithstanding a denial, is just as clear,and this case was cited in 6 W. & S. to prove that a mandamus
did.not lie, but that the relief was on the statute of Westminster
as indicated in this case in Showers.
All of the. other cases cited, which are authoritative on this
Court, are opinions rendered on sealed bills of exceptions, in
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which the whole record was, of course, before the Court, and the
weight of the exception could be considered after full argument.
The statutes in this state, requiring judges to file their opinions
on any point of law, do not apply to the District Court.
The ruit) of the District Court relied upon, it is submitted, is'
beyond its power, if it be applied to a charge which cannot be
separated into parts without doing injustice to the judge.
George W. Biddle and Meredith, for Judge Stroud, argued
that the exceptions were not to points of law within the meaning
of the statute, or were not in the form required by the rules and
practice of the District Court.
PER CURIAm.-The writ awarded in the above- case, after
reciting the material facts alleged under oath by the petitioner,
commanded Judge Stroud, if so it be, that he should on a certain
day affix his seal to the exceptions alleged by the petitioner,
according to the form of the statute. This was the whole exigency
of the writ. It was framed upon the statute of Westm. 2, which
was the statute referred to, and neither the statute nor the writ
required more of the judge than that he confess and seal the
exceptions, or deny them. If he confessed and sealed them they
became part of the record, and the party would have his writ of
error to remove them with the record into this court for review;
if he denied them, the petitioner would have his action at law for
a false return.
The judge was not called on to show cause why he'should not
seal the exceptions, and we had nothing to do in this proceeding
with the quality of the exceptions; and hence the voluminous
argument introduced into the return to prove that the petitioner
was not entitled to the exceptions was utterly irrelevant. When
the record comes up, upon a writ of error, will be th'e time for us
to consider whether the exceptions Nfere duly taken under the
rules of the District Court, and whether they are sufficient in
law, and-we are not to be precipitated into a premature consideration of these points. The statute which gives the writ imposes
no such duty upon us at present.
On the ,round that the return was argumentative and uncertain, we allowed exceptions to be filed to it, and these brought
out the fact that, notwithstanding the protestations and qualifiua-
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tions of the return, it did, in reality, amount to a confession of
the exceptions, and the judge accompanied it with an explicit and
repeated oral declaration in the presence of this court, of his
willingness to seal the bill if we should be of opinion that he
ought to do so.
Seeing that it is now admitted on all hands that the return
confesses the bills as alleged, we, of course, think the judge ought
to sign them. And in saying so we found ourselves entirely on
the confession, and not upon the nature or legal effect of the bills.
When we issued the writ we said this would be his duty in the
event of a confession, and that we stated the practice correctly is
shown by all the cases cited by counsel.
The whole law of the writ was condensed into a few words in
the case of Bridgeman v. Holt (Showers's Parl. Gases 111),
where, after giving the substance of the. writ in Latin, it is-said:
" Si ita is conditional; if the bill be true and duly rendered, then
this writ; and if it be returned, quod non ita est, then the action
of a false return, and thereupon the surmige will be tried, and if
found to be so, damages ; and upon such a recovery, a peremptory
writ commanding the same."
The writ we issued was preliminary and alternative. The return
is quod ita est. Judge Stroud's offer to seal the bills may, therefore, be accepted as the legitimate fruit of the writ, and as
obviating the necessity for any further process.
Let the bills be sealed.
Prius
when it was determined, and took no part in its final decision.
AGNEW, J., heard this cause, but was absent at Nisi

